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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
S. C. KELSEY and DAVID E. 
SORENSEN, 
Plaint lj)'s-Appellants, 
-vs.-
C. PHIL HANSEN and 
BOB BOYER, 
Defendarnts-Respondents. 
Case 
No.10568 
AP·PELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEl\IENT OF THE CASE 
This action is brought to require payment of a col-
lateral obligation as appears in an "Earnest Money Re-
ceipt and Offer to Purchase" agreement wherein one 
purchaser under the agreement did not become a grantee 
of the real property to which the collateral agreement 
applied. 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
This case was tried before the court. At the close 
of plaintiff's case in chief defendant Boyer moved to dis-
miss. After defendant Boyer had presented his evi-
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dence the motion was granted; and an Order was made 
dismissing plaintiff's complaint. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek reversal of the Order of Dismissal 
and judgment in their favor as a matter of law, that the 
defendant is liable for payment of the collateral obliga-
tions under the agreement to purchase. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff-appellant Kelsey negotiated to sell an 
apartment building in Clearfield, Utah, to the defend-
ants-respondents, Boyer and Hansen. On September 23, 
196f, defendants entered into a written agreement en-
titled an "Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Pur-
chase" (Exh. 1-P) in which defendants agreed to pay 
for certain "extras" including carpets and drapes on 
which there were amounts then due and outstanding. 
Kelsey at that time agreed to look to both parties for 
the payment due on the ''extras.'' The agreement con-
tained the following clauses: 
Line 27: 
''Contract of Sale or instrument of conveyance to 
be made in the name to be arrarnged 
(Last three words were printed in by hand): and 
Lines 34 and 35 : 
"It is further agreed that execution of the final 
contract shall abrogate this Earnest 1\foney Re-
ceipt and Offer to Purchase.'' 
Snbscqnent to the signing of the agreement and without 
the knowledge of plaintiff, defendants Hansen and Boyer 
11cgotia tcd together and traded properties and separate 
interests in properties one with another to the end re-
sult that the Clearfield property to be purchased from 
plaintiff ·was to he taken in the name of defendant Han-
sen (Tr. p. 40). The final papers were "arranged" b.v 
the defendants in accordance with line 27 of the agree-
ment and without consultation ·with plaintiff. (Tr. p. 
40-41) Boyer testified that he received from Hansen 
some consideration for allowing Hansen to become the 
purchaser of the Kelsey property. (Tr. p.43) At Boyer's 
request, plaintiff ·went to defendants' place of business 
and was then presented with the prepared deed to the 
Clearfield property. (Exh. 2-P) \Vithout receiving ex-
planation as to ·whom the property was to be ronveyed, 
he signed it. (Tr. p. 27) Hansen has refused to pay the 
obligations for the "extras" and has recently filed his 
petition in bankruptcy. (Tr. p. 30) Boyer has refused 
payment of any part of the agreement. 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff contends that defendant Boyer is obligated 
under the purchase agreement for the payment of 
the amounts outstanding which were collateral to the 
agTeement to convey property even though he did not 
hecome a grantee under the deed. He cannot forgive 
and then forget his own debt. 
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I. THE PROMISE TO PAY FOR CERTAIN 
"EXTRAS" IS A COLLATERAL AGREFJ-
MENT TO THE DEED. 
A collateral agreement is designed to take effect 
after the execution of the deed. It is generally held that 
where the agreement calls for performance of the obli-
gation subsequent to the time that conveyance is to he 
made, the intent that the agreement is to survive the 
execution of the deed is shown. The doctrine of merger 
of the agreement into the deed would not be applira blc 
in such a situation. Annotation 38 ALR 2d 1310. rrhe 
agreement to pay for the ''extras'' was not incorporated 
into the conveyance of the land and remained enforce a hle 
as a wholly collateral agreement. 
Three Utah cases involving the doctrine of merger 
have recognized the general rule and an action on an 
antecedent contract Knight v. Southern Pacific Co., 52 
Utah 42, 172 P. 689 (1918), involved an alleged implied 
agreement of purchaser to maintain fences. The court 
held that the antecedent agreement could only be used 
for the purpose of showing a consideration paid by the 
purchaser. Since the agreement as to the consideration 
was fulfilled the question of consideration was not ma-
terial. All other covenants were held to have merged in 
the deed and recovery was denied. Utah Savings & Trust 
Co. v. Stout, 36 Utah 210, 102 P. 865 (1909), involved 
covenants in the deed as to title and the executed ron-
tract was fully performed by the execution and delivery 
of the deed. See also Reese Howell Co. v. Bro1c11, 48 Ut. 
142, 158 P. 684 (1916). These cases are distinguishable' 
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from the case at bar in that they did not involve a col-
lateral and independent agreement which was to be per-
formed subsequent to the conveyance of the property. 
However, the Knight case recognizes that matters of con-
sideration must be viewed in the light of the sales agree-
ment and such matters do not merge in the deed as a 
matter of law. 
The case in question concerns part of the agreed 
ronsideration to be paid for consummation of the purchase 
agreement. When the purchasers assumed the collateral 
obligations they assumed debts which were to be paid in 
installments which •vere not then due but became due sub-
sequent to the conveyance. In SA Thompson in Real 
Property, § 4458 and an annotation in 84ALR 1041, nu-
merous cases are cited which hold in effect that an agree-
ment to assume a mortgage debt is a collateral and inde-
pendent agreement and may exist separate from and in-
dependently of the deed. Dieckman v. Walser, 114 N.J. 
Eq. 382, 168 A. 582 (1933) Affg. 12 N. J. Eq. 46, 163 
A. 284. 
"There is not, however, a merger of collateral 
independent agreements. Where the contract of 
sale contemplates a collateral act ... the contract 
is not merged into the subsequent deed ... These 
collateral agreements in a contract to give a deed 
which do not merge in the deed may be treated as 
separate covenants on which suit may be brought. 
If the sales contract is not essential or germane 
to the deed it is not merged in the contract. Con-
tractnral provisions as to the payment of the pur-
rhase price are not merged in the deed and may 
suhsequc>ntly be shown by evidence dehors the 
deed .... "Annotation 52 ALR 2d 647. 
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The agreement to be deemed collateral and independ-
ent so as not to be merged or satisfied in the executio11 of 
the deed must not look to or be connected with title, pos-
session, quality or emblements of the land which is suh-
ject of the contract. 1965 Supplement to Thompson ill 
Real Property, Vol. 8A, Page 13; Continental Life Insur-
ance Co'. v. Smith, 41 N. M. 82, 64 P. 2d 377 (1936). In the 
case at bar the contract obligation is to the payment of 
cost of chattels separate from the realty itself. Tlwre 
was no merger in the deed of terms which were not ful-
filled by delivery of the deed. Fitzpatrick v. AZZ,irrl Con-
struction Co., 24 Ill. 2nd 448, 182 N.E. 2nd 183 (1962). 
Delivery of the deed by Kelsey did not constitute 
and was not intended to be full performance of the agree-
ment to sell. 26 C. J. S. Deeds § 91 (c) at p. 845. Sec 
also Wech v. A & M Sunrise Construction Co., 36 Ill. A pp. 
2nd 282, 184 N.E. 2nd 758 (1962) and in Shetzen v. C. CJ. 
Aycock Realty Co., 93 Ga. App. 477, 92 S.E. 2nd 114 
(1956) a third party not a party to the deed prevailed in 
a case on a collateral agreement of the antecedent 
contract. 
The purpose of the Kelsey deed was to convey title 
to the land in a formal document and was not intended 
to describe the terms of the preceding contract under 
which the land was sold nor to enumerate the considera-
tion of the transaction. The terms of the contract as 
to the payment for certain "extras" are neither contra-
dictory of nor inconsistent 'vith the deed, and the proYi-
sions survive the deed as continuing obligations. (food-
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·''J!CCd v. Nichols, 2311\Iich. 308, 204 N.W.122 (1925). rrhe 
Restatement of Contracts follows this reasoning. §240(2). 
"(2) \Vhere no consideration is stated in an inte-
gration, facts showing that there was considera-
tion and the nature of it, even if it was a prom-
ise, or any facts that are sufficient to make a prom-
ise enforceable, are admissible in evidence and 
are operative." 
The comment to the restatement suggests that this is 
especially true where the writing is of a formal character 
and does not lend itself to the inclusion of the whole 
agreement. 
The same exception as to the obligations of the land 
purchase contract not becoming merged in a deed has 
been applied to an agreement to pay for certain chat-
tels in State Bank v. Sheldon, 130 Misc. 64, 223 NYS 
634 (1927), where the purchasers of a hotel assumed as 
part of the purchase price a chattel mortgage on certain 
personal property in the hotel. It was held that suoh 
assumption and promise to pay was not merged in the 
<leed since that instrument related only to real estate 
and had no inconsistent agreement as to the chattel 
mortgage. 
II. THE PURCHASERS "WERE NOT RE-
LEASED FROM COLLATERAL OBLI-
GATIONS UNDER CONTRACT WHICH 
WERE NOT MADE A PART OF THE 
SUBSEQUENT DEED. 
Plaintiff accepted Boyer as a purchaser and was 
Natisfiecl that he could pay the consideration agreed upon 
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and outlined in the contract. He did not deal ·with Ha11-
sen and in fact Boyer signed the agreement for Hmrnr11 
and for himself. (Tr. 42 and 43) The terms of the c011-
tract left "to be arranged" at a future date whom the 
purchasers would designate to become the final grantees. 
Yet even then Boyer was willing to o bliga tr himself to 
the payment of the amounts clue for ''extras.'' Bo.Yer 
testified that he obtained some interest in propertirs 
from Hansen for giving Hansen the opportunity to take 
the Kelsey property in his own name. (Tr. p. 43) Hrn·-
ing received some benefit from the transaction he can-
not now disclaim his obligation by his permitting another 
to become the sole grantee. Boyer would be getting all 
the enrichment and none of the obligations. 
Suppose Boyer assigned his interest to another, hr 
would remain liable. Suppose for estate planning rea-
~ons he wanted a member of his family to become the 
grantee, he still would be obligated. The contract would 
he abrogated only as to its terms "'hich were contradic-
tory or inconsistent with the subsequent deed. If clefeml-
ant Boyer were to be released of his obligation merely 
by his own act of arranging for a different grantee, the 
contract would be ineffective from its inception as to the 
parties to be charged. 
rrhe case at bar is similar to Linbrook Realty CorjJ. Y. 
Rogers, 158 Va. 181, 163 S.E. 346, 84 ALR 1035 (193~). 
Plaintiff and defendant entered into a contract for thl' 
sale of property agreeing to a certain amount of cash and 
the assumption by the clef enclant of a deed in trnst ill-
volYing a mortgage. When the deed was prep<lrc•d the 
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llefendant requested that the plaintiff ( instead of con-
veying property to it, convey to a third party who ''»as 
a stranger to the plaintiff. It appeared that plaintiff 
·was not acquainted with the terms of the agreement be-
tween the defeendant and the third party at the time 
the deed was executed. Subsequently there was a de-
fault in the payment of the first deed of trust, and the 
property was sold at public auction resulting in a de-
ficiency in the plaintiff. It was argued by the defendant 
that the contract embracing the results of all the nego-
tiations leading to the execution of the deed, became 
merged in the deed and as the deed contained no assump-
tion of the trust deed and was made in the name of the 
third party, that therefore the defendant was no longer 
liable under the deed. The defendant also claimed that 
the conveyance of the property to the third person as 
grantee was a novation of the agreement and so the 
agreement was superseded. The Court held that to con-
stitute a novation it necessitated the creation of a new 
contract by extinguishment of the old. The burden was 
on the defendant to prove the establishment of a new 
contractual relationship between the plaintiff and the 
third party, as well as the extinguishment of the rela-
tions behveen the plaintiff and the defendant. The true 
ronsideration for the agreement was expressed in the 
rontract and the deed did not negate that consideration 
nor supersede the required consideration under the con-
tract. .Judgment "'as affirmed against the defendant. 
In the case of 8tocldon v. Gould, 149 Pa. 69, 24 A. 
160 (1892), part of the contract for the exchange of 
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property was that the defendant for himself and his hei 1,, 
and assigns, assumed and agreed to pay a certain mort-
gage on the plaintiff's property, and subsequently the 
plaintiff conveyed the premises to defendant's son whose 
name was inserted in the deed without the plai11tiff 's 
knowledge. The deed provided that the conveyance 1rns 
"under and subject to the payment of a certain mort-
gage.'' The court refused to instruct that the conhad, 
whereby the defendant agreed to purchase the property, 
and assumed for his assigns as well as for himself am1 
his heirs, the payment of the mortgage thereon, "'as as 
to such provision, merged in the subsequent conveyance 
to the defendant's son, and the defendant was hel(1 rP-
sponsible for the payment of the mortgage even thnu.!.d1 
he was not a grantee under the deed. 
In Shockley v. Roezz1·, 188 Wis. 564, 206 N.W. s;iG 
(1926) Roelli and his wife entered into a written euntraet 
with one Olsen for the purchase of certain tracts of 
land wherein the Olsens as part of the purchase price 
agreed to pay two outstanding mortgages against th0 
land. Before the time came for the delivery of a deecl 
to the Olsens, they sold the land to Mrs. Ler. Tl1e 
Roellis offered to deed to the Olsens, hut they were rl'-
quested by the Olsens as an accommodation to them, to 
name Mrs. Lee as grantee in the deed, and they di11 so. 
and delivered the deed to the Olsens. l\Irs. Lee failed 
to pay and foreclosure was begun. It 'vas held that tlte 
Olsens, although they 'vere not grantees, we1·e pen;o11nlly 
liable for the payment of the mortgage. 
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Boyer claims protection from his own unsolicited 
t1ct of taking other property from Hansen rather than 
be a grantee of the Kelsey property. His mere non-ap-
pearance as a grantee does not revoke his obligation to 
assume the payments due on the "extras" which were in-
cluded in the purchase. 
CONCLUSION 
A written agreement between the seller and the 
purchasers for the conveyance of real estate is not exe-
cuted by and merged in a deed as to collateral and inde-
pendent stipulations to be performed by the purchasers. 
The agreement to convey was not fully performed by the 
exerution and delivery of the deed. The formal deed 
<lid not set forth the terms of the consideration to be paid. 
It did not supersede the stipulations of the purchasing 
parties which are collateral to and independent of the 
simple conveyance itself. In this case the deed should 
he considered as part of the transaction of sale in con-
nection with, and not to the exclusion of the antecedent 
contract. 
The contract having set forth the obligations of 
Royer and Boyer having agreed to those obligations he 
remains bound and the fact that he does not become a 
grantee under the deed does not relieve him of this bur-
den. He cannot forgive and then forget his own debts. 
Respectfully submitted, 
M. BYRON FISHER of 
RICHARDS, BIRD AND HART 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-
Appellants 
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